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Abstract: This paper presents a complete set of results describing the effects of monetary
policy in 10 countries of the euro area for the pre-EMU period. For each country, we
impose one of three identification schemes depending on its monetary integration with
Germany, the nominal anchor of the ERM. The first identification scheme applies to
Germany, the second to countries of the core EMS (Austria, Belgium and the
Netherlands) and the third to all the other countries. An unexpected rise in the short-term
interest rate leads to a decrease in GDP, (with investment and exports falling more than
consumption) and a gradual decrease in prices for all countries. We also show that, given
the width of the error bands around the estimate, we cannot reject that the effects of
monetary policy on GDP and on prices are broadly similar in the individual countries of
the euro area.
JEL classification system: E52.
Keywords: Euro area countries, monetary policy, VARs.
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Non-technical summary
This paper analyses the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in 10 countries
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherland and
Spain) that are now members of the euro area. We use VAR models, which is the most
widely used empirical methodology to analyse the transmission mechanism. In Europe,
the perspective of EMU led a large part of the literature to use VARs to evaluate cross-
country differences in the transmission mechanism. The typical paper in this literature
imposes the same identification of monetary policy shocks across countries, in spite of the
differences in monetary policy regime of each country within the European Monetary
System (EMS). For instance, Germany could follow an independent monetary policy as
the de facto anchor of the EMS while the interest rate of a country like Austria was tied
by the fixed exchange rate with the Deutsche Mark during most of the past 20 years. We
propose instead to estimate for each country a model that accounts for the EMS constraint
to which the country was subject during the sample period. We form three groups of
“monetary policy regime-like countries” depending on their monetary integration with
Germany. As the anchor of the EMS, Germany is a group on its own for obvious reasons.
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands form the second group. We model their monetary
policy as if they were in a "fixed" exchange rate regime with respect to Germany. It
follows that they do not have autonomous monetary policy shocks. All the other countries
are modelled as open economies with a flexible exchange rate vis-à-vis Germany. The
influence of German monetary policy is taken into account by including the German
interest rate and the bilateral Deutsche Mark exchange rate in the model. Although the
German interest rate is then a major argument of the reaction function of the central bank,
there is room for “autonomous” domestic monetary policy in the adjustment of domestic
interest rate around the German interest rate.
The contribution of the paper with respect to the existing VAR literature on the
transmission mechanism in euro area countries is threefold. First, we show that imposing
one of three relatively simple identification schemes, depending on our knowledge of the
monetary policy decision process in the EMS, obtain well-behaved and qualitatively
consistent effects of the monetary policy shocks in all the countries. While our models are
fairly similar and comparable, we avoid the implausible uniformity of approaches that
characterises most of the VAR literature on international comparisons of the transmission
mechanism. We also avoid the multiplication of models that confuses the cross-country
comparison. The results of our model are consistent with the consensus view on the
transmission mechanism.  A contractionary monetary policy shock is defined as a positive
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deviation of the interest rate from the average reaction function of the central bank for the
sample period. It leads to a temporary fall in GDP that peaks typically around four
quarters after the shock and to a gradual decrease in the price level. We also show that for
most countries, M1 initially decreases and that the response of investment is larger than
the one of consumption. Second, the results of our estimations at the country level are
compared to the results obtained in a VAR estimated with euro area aggregates by
Peersman and Smets (2001). We show that the effects of monetary policy on prices and
on output estimated for each country are usually qualitatively similar to the ones obtained
when the model is estimated on the aggregate euro area economy. Third, we compare the
“artificial” monetary policy shocks measured for the euro area with the ones of the
individual countries. The euro area shocks seem to be dominated by the French, the
Italian and the Spanish monetary policy shocks. In particular, the early 1990s appear as a
contraction for the euro area and for most of the individual countries while the Deutsche
Bundesbank was just reacting to the reunification boom.
Finally, the paper stresses that, given that the confidence bands around the responses are
generally large, one can not use VAR models to conclude that some countries are
characterised by larger effects of monetary policy than others.
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1. Introduction
Understanding the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the euro area is of
primary importance for the implementation of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy strategy.
Although the Eurosystem targets price stability for the area as a whole, country level
evidence should not be neglected for two reasons. First, the analysis of the transmission
mechanism is usually carried out within models that assume a reaction function of the
central bank. This assumption is somewhat artificial when considering the euro area
economy as a whole before the start of EMU. Therefore estimating central bank reaction
functions at the country level seems more appropriate. Second, economists are still
uncertain about the effects of monetary policy on economic activity and prices. Recent
empirical and theoretical studies, mainly focused on the US economy, tend to converge on
the view that contractionary monetary policy shocks lead to a temporary decrease in
output and to a gradual decline in prices. These results are convincing, and therefore
policy relevant, mainly because they are derived from models that imbed a plausible
description of the monetary policy decision process. While uncertainty on the
transmission mechanism is even more critical in the context of EMU, the experience of
each country before EMU provides additional empirical evidence, which can be used to
reduce uncertainty about the transmission of monetary policy.
This paper analyses the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in 10 countries that
are now members of the euro area1. We use VAR models, which is the most widely used
empirical methodology to analyse the transmission mechanism. The use of VARs for the
analysis of monetary policy started with the seminal work of Sims (1980). Recently,
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) have
reviewed what one has learned from this extensive literature regarding the monetary
transmission mechanism in the United States. In Europe, the perspective of EMU led a
large part of the literature to use VARs to evaluate cross-country differences in the
transmission mechanism. The typical paper in this literature imposes the same
identification of monetary policy shocks across countries, in spite of the differences in
monetary policy regime of each country within the European Monetary System (EMS).
For instance, Germany could follow an independent monetary policy as the de facto
anchor of the EMS while the interest rate of a country like Austria was tied by the fixed
exchange rate with the German Mark during most of the past 20 years. We propose
instead to estimate for each country a model that accounts for the EMS constraint to
                                                     
1 Luxembourg is not modelled because it formed a monetary union with Belgium, and had no independent
monetary policy. Portugal is also excluded because of data limitations.
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which the country was subject during the sample period. We form three groups of
“monetary policy regime-like countries” depending on their monetary integration with
Germany. As the anchor of the EMS, Germany is a group on its own for obvious reasons.
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands form the second group. We model their monetary
policy as if they were in a "fixed" exchange rate regime with respect to Germany. It
follows that they do not have autonomous monetary policy shocks. All the other countries
are modelled as open economies with a flexible exchange rate vis-à-vis Germany. The
influence of German monetary policy is taken into account by including the German
interest rate and the bilateral Deutsche Mark (DM) exchange rate in the model. Although
the German interest rate is then a major argument of the reaction function of the central
bank, there is room for “autonomous” domestic monetary policy in the adjustment of
domestic interest rate around the German interest rate.
The contribution of the paper with respect to the existing VAR literature on the
transmission mechanism in euro area countries is threefold. First, we show that imposing
one of three relatively simple identification schemes, depending on our knowledge of the
monetary policy decision process in the EMS,2 obtain well-behaved and qualitatively
consistent effects of the monetary policy shocks in all the countries. While our models are
fairly similar and comparable, we avoid the implausible uniformity of approaches that
characterises most of the VAR literature on international comparisons of the transmission
mechanism. We also avoid the multiplication of models that confuses the cross-country
comparison. The results of our model are consistent with the consensus view on the
transmission mechanism.  A contractionary monetary policy shock is defined as a positive
deviation of the interest rate from the average reaction function of the central bank for the
sample period. It leads to a temporary fall in GDP that peaks typically around four
quarters after the shock and to a gradual decrease in the price level We also show that for
most countries, M1 initially decreases and that the response of investment is larger than
the one of consumption. Second, the results of our estimations at the country level are
compared to the results obtained in a VAR estimated with euro area aggregates by
Peersman and Smets (2001). We show that the effects of monetary policy on prices and
on output estimated for each country are usually qualitatively similar to the ones obtained
when the model is estimated on the aggregate euro area economy. Third, we show how
the monetary policy shocks defined at the euro area level relate to the particular episodes
of the domestic monetary policy shocks of the different countries.
                                                     
2 See also Clements, Kontomelis and Levy (2001) for a complementary point of view on the role of the
EMS in the transmission mechanism. Their study focuses on the effects of the German monetary policy
shock on all the other countries of the euro area.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature.
Section 3 describes the three identification schemes chosen and section 4 the results of
their implementation. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2. The empirical analysis of the effects of monetary policy in the individual
countries of the Euro area
In this section, we review the empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of
monetary policy shocks in the euro area countries. We briefly describe the modelling
framework chosen in the different studies. It appears that most of the cross-country
comparison studies based on VARs do not model the EMS context of monetary policy.
First, the BIS (1995) reports simulation exercises from macroeconometric models, either
country models developed by the central banks or the multi-country model of the Federal
Reserve Board. The report presents the effects of a temporary 100 basis points increase in
the policy rate for eight quarters, after which the policy rate would return to baseline.
Second, Britton and Whitley (1997) simulate a variant of the Mundell-Flemming model to
analyse the transmission mechanism in the UK, France and Germany. Third, Dornbusch,
Favero and Giavazzi (1998) use a small simultaneous model for output in different
countries. The impact of monetary policy on output is simulated with fixed exchange
rates within Europe. In the same spirit, Peersman and Smets (1999) simulate the effects of
a German monetary policy shock while allowing for the interaction effects among the
countries. Fourth, Sala (2001) implements a dynamic factor model for six countries of the
euro area. He estimates three common components to the six countries and identifies one
of them as a “common” monetary policy shock. He then reports the effects of this shock
on individual countries.
Fifth, a vast majority of studies used VAR models. These studies differ in terms of the
variables included in the VAR, the number of euro area countries covered and the
identification strategy chosen. Gerlach and Smets (1995) used a VAR approach with a
combination of short run and long run restrictions for the G7-countries. Only three
variables are included in their VAR: output, the price level and the interest rate.
Ramaswamy and Sloek (1997) estimate a simple three-variable (output, the price level
and the interest rate) VAR for 12 EU-countries3. Dedola and Lippi (2000) estimate the
effects of a one-percentage point increase in the short-term interest rate using an VAR
containing industrial production, commodity prices, the price level, the money stock and
                                                     
3 See also the recent paper by Mihov (2001) for a comparable model estimated for 5 countries of the euro
area.
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the short-term interest rate. Barran, Coudert and Mojon (1997) estimate several VARs
including combinations of GDP, prices, DM exchange rate, world price index, money,
credit and the long term interest rate for nine European countries. Ehrmann (2000)
estimates a VAR of industrial production, prices, an exchange rate, an interest rate and,
when appropriate, another variable that is relevant for the specific monetary policy
context of the country.
One important shortcoming of the VAR papers above is that the EMS context of
monetary policy is either not modelled or limited to the inclusion of the DM exchange
rate in the model (Barran et al. or Ehrmann). Most of the VAR studies that have
explicitely modelled the EMS context focus on one or on a small number of
countries.4 Smets (1997) focuses on Germany, Italy and France, Kim (1998) investigates
the cases of Spain and France, De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (1998) and Gaiotti (1999)
concentrate on Italy, Shioji (1997) on Spain while Levy and Halikias (1997) and
Mojon (1999) focus on France. These studies5 show that over the last two decades, the
monetary policy interest rate of Spain, France and Italy was largely, albeit not entirely
driven by the German interest rate. While the room for a domestic monetary policy
existed for these three countries, not accounting for the German leading role in the EMS
leads to mis-identification of monetary policy shocks. For instance, periods of rising
German interest rates could be wrongly interpreted as periods of domestic monetary
policy tightening.
In this paper, we implement a monetary policy identification scheme that accounts for the
EMS context for all the countries of the euro area, for which quarterly national account
data are available. This is the purpose of the next section.
3. Identification
This section discusses in turn the three identification schemes we propose to describe
monetary policy in each of the three groups of countries mentioned in the introduction. It
then recalls the specification of the benchmark Peersman and Smets (2001) model of the
euro area.
                                                     
4 Two related recent studies use VAR models to evaluate the effect of the single monetary policy in each of
the countries. Clements et al. (2001) report the effect of monetary policy shocks when the reaction
function is constrained to be similar across countries and the intra-EU exchange rates are fixed.
Peersman (2001) estimates the effects of area-wide monetary policy shocks on the individual countries.
5 See Mojon (1999) for a survey of these studies.
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3.1 VAR models for the individual countries in the euro area
In this section  we present VAR models for all euro area countries except Luxembourg
and Portugal. We discuss the features of the model that are necessary to fit the individual
country experiences. In doing so, our objective is to limit the differences in the models
that apply to the different countries, so as to preserve comparability in the outcome of the
estimates. We distinguish three groups. The first group contains Germany, which played a
special role as the de facto anchor within the EMS system. The second group of countries
consists of Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. These countries have maintained their
fixed exchange rate parity against the DM during most of the sample period. All the other
countries (Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain) can be described by a similar
VAR model. Most of these countries have participated in fixed, but adjustable exchange
rate regimes during large parts of the sample period, but nevertheless experienced quite
large parity changes. With the exception of France and Ireland, each of these countries
also went through a floating exchange rate period during the sample period.
3.1.1 Germany
For Germany, we estimate the following VAR model, comparable with the benchmark
model of Peersman and Smets (2001).
[1] tttt XLBYLAY µ++= − )()( 1
The variables included in the model can be divided into two groups.6 The first group of
variables, tX , contains a world commodity price index ( tcp ), US real GDP (
US
ty ), and
the US short-term nominal interest rate ( USts ). These variables are included to control for
changes in world demand and inflation. Moreover, the inclusion of these variables helps
to solve the so-called price puzzle (i.e. the empirical finding in the VAR literature that
prices rise following an interest rate tightening).7 In all of the results reported below, we
assume that this group of variables is exogenous to the rest of the VAR-model. In other
words, these variables influence the other variables of the model, tY , but there is no
feedback from the other variables to these variables. Further, we also allow for a
contemporaneous impact of the exogenous variables on the endogenous variables.
[2] [ ]UStUSttt sycpX ='
                                                     
6 Each of the VAR models contains also a constant and a linear trend.
7 See for example the results of Sims (1992).
[ ]
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The endogenous variables of the benchmark model, tY , consist of real GDP ( ty ),
consumer prices ( tp ), the domestic short-term nominal interest rate ( ts ) and the real
effective exchange rate ( tx ):
[3] [ ]ttttt xspyY ='
The main difference of this model with the standard VAR model used to identify
monetary shocks either for the US, but also for Germany, is that we do not include money
in the model. This omission is mainly motivated by our aim to estimate models that would
be as similar as possible across countries. Because most countries now in EMU had a DM
exchange rate target during the period preceding the introduction of the single currency,
monetary aggregates have had a secondary role in the monetary policy strategy of these
countries. This is why we do not include a money aggregate in our benchmark model,
neither for these countries, nor for Germany, nor for the Peersman and Smets (2001) euro
area results reported in this paper8. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the inclusion of
money in the model did not affect the impact of the German interest rate shock on output
and prices. In addition, we also show that the identification of the benchmark model
implies that a contractionary monetary policy shock is followed by a fall in money for
most of the countries. In other words, our monetary shocks identified in a model without
money do not produce a liquidity puzzle.
Turning to the identification of a monetary policy shock, we allow for a contemporaneous
interaction between the German interest rate and the real effective exchange rate.
Assuming that there is no contemporaneous reaction of the central bank to an exchange
rate shock may be appropriate for relatively closed economies such as the euro area and
the US, but is less justifiable for an open economy such as Germany. For example, both
Bernanke and Mihov (1997) and Clarida and Gertler (1997) have found a significant
contemporaneous response of German interest rates to changes in the exchange rate.
Similarly, Smets and Wouters (1999) show that allowing for such a response helps to
avoid a price puzzle. Following Smets and Wouters (1999), we solve the simultaneity
problem by estimating the reaction coefficient on the exchange rate using the spread
between the French and the German long-term interest rate and US dollar/Yen exchange
rate as instruments.9
                                                     
8  See also in Peersman and Smets (2001) for a comparison of the response of GDP and prices using
alternative identification strategies.
9 See Smets and Wouters (1999) for an explanation on the implementation of this two-step methodology.
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3.1.2 Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands
During most of the sample period, Austria, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent,
Belgium, have maintained a fixed central exchange rate parity vis-à-vis the DM.10 This
implies that in these countries the scope for an independent monetary policy was
extremely limited and that it is unlikely that we are able to get precise estimates of the
effects of domestic monetary policy shocks. Instead, most of the policy shocks are likely
to be driven by policy innovations in the German interest rate. Moreover, these countries
are relatively small neighbours of Germany and strongly influenced by economic
conditions in Germany. In this case, we therefore modify the benchmark model by
including German output, prices, real effective exchange rate and short-term interest rate
in the list of endogenous variables and replacing the effective exchange rate with the
bilateral rate versus the DM. In addition, we assume that there is no feedback from the
smaller country to Germany. The monetary policy shock is identified as the shock to the
German interest rate. We can represent this as follows:
[4]
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[5] [ ]DEtDEtDEtDEtDEt xspyY =
[6] [ ]jtjtjtjtjt sxpyY = , j = AT, NL or BE
This implies that we estimate the same monetary policy shocks as in the German case.
The response of the German variables to this monetary policy shock is also unchanged.
The block-recursive structure of this two countries model closely resembles the one
applied by Cushman and Zha (1997) to model the influence of the US economy on
Canada. Cushman and Zha consider the effects of an independent monetary policy
because of the flexible exchange rate regime that characterises Canada. In contrast,
because there was hardly any variation of the DM exchange rate during most of the
sample period, we focus on the effects of the German monetary policy shock in Autria,
Belgium and the Netherlands.
                                                     
10 The central parity within the EMS changed only in the early 1980s for the Netherlands, and in 1982,
1983, 1986 and 1987 for Belgium. The Austrian exchange rate did fluctuate in a very narrow band for
the whole sample period.
]]
]
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3.1.3 The other countries: Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain
For all the other countries, we modify the German model in two respects. First, we
include the German short-term interest rate in the block of endogenous variables. Second,
we replace the real effective exchange rate with the nominal bilateral DM exchange rate
given its prominence in the EMS.11 This leads to the following set of endogenous
variables:
[7] [ ]ttDEtttt sxspyY ='
The German interest rate is included in addition to the bilateral DM exchange rate in
order to describe the role of Germany as an anchor of the ERM. The domestic interest
rate may respond to the German one without any impact on the exchange rate, as it would
be the case in a fixed exchange rate regime. This can turn out to be important when
estimating a model at a quarterly frequency, while exchange rates and interest rates
interact continuously. Basically, we assume that domestic monetary policy shocks are
defined as deviations of the domestic interest rate from the German interest rate12. In
other words, we describe the effects of monetary shocks taken in the process of nominal
convergence, which took place before EMU. We obtain that the estimated domestic
policy shocks lead to a decrease in prices. It is interesting to note that neglecting the
German interest rate in the model results in a price puzzle for many of these countries.
The reason is that if one does not control for increases in the domestic interest rate that
are a response to increases in the German rate, such changes may be associated with a
depreciation of the exchange rate. This in turn puts upward pressure on prices. As before,
the domestic policy shock is identified using a standard recursive identification scheme,
which corresponds to the ordering of the variables in [7]. This means that there is a
contemporaneous impact of all the endogenous variables on the monetary policy variable.
On the other hand, there is no immediate impact of a monetary policy shock on the other
variables. The ordering of the bilateral DM exchange rate before the domestic interest
rate is plausible since there was a fixed exchange rate regime during most of the
estimation period. However, the results are robust with respect to a reverse ordering of the
domestic interest rate and the bilateral DM exchange rate. Also allowing for a two-way
interaction between the exchange rate and the domestic interest rate did not significantly
affect the results.
                                                     
11  Using an effective exchange rate does not change the estimated effect of monetary policy shocks on prices
and on output in any significant way. We prefer to include the bilateral DM exchange rate in order to
model the specific situation of the EMS.
12 The macro-econometric model of the Banque de France also defines the reaction function in terms of
deviations from the German interest rate.
]
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It is important to bear in mind that in the case of Greece, monetary policy was
implemented through “quantity rationing of the banks” so that the three month interest
rate was left unchanged for long periods during the 1980’s. The results for this country
should therefore be taken with extra caution.
3.2 The specification of the benchmark VAR-model for the euro area
The VAR-model from Peersman and Smets (2001) that we use to analyse the effects of a
monetary policy shock in the euro area has the same representation as the one presented
for Germany above. The only difference is that the policy shock for the euro area is
identified through a standard Choleski-decomposition with the variables ordered as
mentioned above.13 The underlying assumption is that policy shocks have no
contemporaneous impact on output and prices, but may affect the exchange rate
immediately. However, the policy interest rate does not respond to contemporaneous
changes in the effective exchange rate. The latter assumption is appropriate for a large,
relatively closed, economy such as the euro area as a whole. 14
4. Results
4.1 Estimation
Unless otherwise mentioned, each of the VAR-models is estimated in levels over the
period 1980-1998, which corresponds approximately to the start of the EMS.15 In the case
of Germany, for which we consider that the monetary policy decision process is
independent of the EMS, we estimated the model for the longest period of data
availability, i.e. 1970-1998. In this paper we do not perform an explicit analysis of the
long run behaviour of the economy. By doing the analysis in levels we allow for implicit
cointegrating relationships in the data (Chap. 18 in Hamilton, 1994). A more explicit
analysis of the long-run behaviour of the various variables is limited by the relatively
short sample available.16 The data are seasonally adjusted logs, except the interest rates,
which are in levels. We use the three-month interest rate17 as the monetary policy rate as
this is the only short-term interest rate that is available for all countries over the whole
                                                     
13 As in Sims (1980) and Christiano et al (1998).
14 Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) make the same assumption for the US. One can argue that the euro area
as a whole is more like the US in terms of openness than like any of its individual members.
15  Also, we took 1980 as a starting date because some of the data series used are only available from that
year.
16 See Ehrmann (2000) for an explicit cointegration analysis of VAR models for the countries of the euro
area.
17  Except in Greece where we use the three-month average of the overnight rate.
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sample period. Standard likelihood ratio tests are used to determine the lag-order of the
VARs, which usually turns out to be of order two or three.
Chow break tests did not reject the overall stability of the various VARs at the 5%
confidence level. However, in some countries instability was detected in some of the
equations of the VAR. This was in particular the case for Italy where overall stability is
rejected at the 10% confidence level. Both the Italian output and exchange rate equation
appear to be subject to a significant break in the third quarter of 1992 coinciding with the
outbreak of the EMS crisis and the floating of the Italian lira. Also in Finland there is
some evidence of instability in the exchange rate equation in the early 1990s. In the case
of Germany, it turns out that a longer sample period helps to reduce the weight of the
reunification episode, when the monetary policy tightening in the early 1990s coincided
with a big positive demand shock due to direct government spending and tax incentives.
Estimating the model just for the 1980’s and 1990’s renders the identification of plausible
effects of German monetary policy extremely tedious.
The results shown for Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands are computed by simulating
the effects of the identified German monetary policy shock, i.e. the impulse responses of
the variables in the German VAR estimated of 1970-1998, on the Austrian, Belgian and
Dutch variables respectively as in [4]. The latter equations are estimated for the period of
the EMS (1980-1998), when these countries where in a de facto fixed exchange rate
regime with Germany.
Finally, both in Ireland and Greece we include a dummy variable for unusual interest rate
increases of more that 10 %. The Irish spike took place in the fourth quarter of 1992 and
the Greek one in the first quarter of 1994.
4.2 Discussion of the results
The results of the identification schemes described in section 3 for each of the individual
countries and the euro area are shown in Graph 1. These graphs summarise for each of the
countries the effects of a one-standard deviation monetary policy shock on domestic real
GDP, domestic consumer prices, the exchange rate (effective real exchange rate in the
case of the euro area and Germany, the bilateral DM exchange rate in the case of the other
countries), and the domestic short-term interest rate. We report the OLS estimate based
impulse response function together with 90 percent confidence bands18. Graph 1 shows
                                                     
18  These confidence bands reported are constructed as the impulse response plus or minus 1.65 standard
deviations of 200 bootstrapped replications of the impulse response. These confidence bands are very
similar, though somewhat narrower than the ones obtained by  Monte Carlo simulations as proposed by
Sims and Zha (1999).
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that in each of the countries, a monetary policy tightening eventually leads to a fall in
output and prices19. It is remarkable that these fairly simple identification schemes
allowed us to compile well-behaved responses of GDP and of prices to a domestic
monetary policy shock. Moreover, these responses are consistent with the area-wide
results. However, some additional features are worth noting.
First, the effects on output and on prices tend to be larger when measured at the country
level than what they appear to be at the euro area level. This may reflect that the effects
on output and prices triggered by monetary policy in the period before EMU worked
through the quantity or price adjustment of trade with other members of EMU. These
effects are expected to disappear in the new monetary policy regime. Second, while the
overall pattern for output and prices is quite similar across countries, the effects on the
exchange rate are less consistent across countries and generally less significant. For
Belgium and the Netherlands the lack of response of the exchange rate to the German
monetary policy shock reflects the full credibility of the EMS for those countries. In
France, Ireland, Greece, Germany and Austria the monetary policy shock triggers an
appreciation of the exchange rate. Finally, in Italy and Spain, we find the so-called
exchange rate puzzle, i.e. a tightening of the monetary policy stance leads to a (only
slightly significant) depreciation of the exchange rate (Grilli and Roubini, 1995). Given
the shifts in exchange rate regime in these countries, the finding of erratic exchange rate
responses should not be too much of a surprise.20 More interesting is that the different
patterns in the exchange rate responses are not reflected in the responses of prices and
output. It is likely that the exchange rate response for one country has often coincided
with a similar change of the exchange rate of other European countries in a similar
direction so that the effective exchange rate of the country was less affected.  Moreover,
the last two decades were characterised by a negative correlation between the DM
exchange rate and the dollar exchange rate of the European currencies.
Third, we show that in the countries of the third group, domestic monetary policy shocks
that were orthogonal to the German interest rate have had the “typical” effects of
monetary policy both on output and on prices. These effects reflect the actions taken by
central banks in these countries to stimulate nominal convergence with Germany. They
                                                     
19 The exception is the impact of monetary policy on output in Ireland. This can be due to the specific
situation of that country with respect to the UK. Moreover, we do not find this erratic behaviour if we
use industrial production instead of GDP and we observe that both consumption and investment
decrease after a monetary tightening. Bredin and O’Reilly (2000) show that taking into account the
influence of the UK on the Irish business cycle helps solving this output puzzle.
20 While some studies (Smets, 1997; Gaiotti, 1999; Hernando, 2000) have shown that other identification
schemes can alleviate this exchange rate puzzle, we prefer to stick to our "simple" model that performs
well in terms of GDP and prices, for the sake of comparability with the other countries.
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may also pick up the effects of the EMS crisis on the 1993 recession and dis-inflation that
followed.
Fourth, the comparison of our results to the estimates of a representative set of previous
studies indicates that taken globally, the literature does not point to any country as
experiencing either weaker or larger effects of monetary policy than the loose average of
the countries.  This is consistent with our (and Kieler and Saarenheimo’s, 1998) finding
of qualitatively similar results across countries and high uncertainty on the size of the
effects. There is no black sheep. Most studies report that, overall, a majority of countries
experience a fall in output (either GDP or industrial production) after a contractionary
monetary policy shock. An overview of the maximum impact on output is provided in
Table 1. The studies present, however, different rankings of the potency of monetary
policy across countries. Some countries are documented to be more sensitive to a
monetary policy shock in one study, but less in another. For example, Barran et al. (1997)
find the largest impact in Germany and the weakest impact in Italy, while Peersman and
Smets (1999) find the opposite.
The problem with most of these cross-country comparisons is that the size of the
estimated monetary policy shock differs across countries. In this paper, for example, a one
standard deviation monetary policy shock is a rise in the short-term interest rate of 48
basis points for Germany, while it is 59 basis points for Italy, and 84 basis points for
Spain. Moreover, this also implies that each individual country has its own monetary
policy reaction function. Thus, even if the same initial disturbance is analysed (e.g. as
done by Dedola and Lippi, 2000), the monetary policy responses would not be
harmonised.21 This is illustrated by the two variants of Gerlach and Smets (1995). In the
first case (a one standard deviation monetary policy shock), the response of output looks
similar across Germany, France and Italy, while in the second case (a one percentage
point, eight-quarters sustained increase of the interest rate), German GDP moves by
almost twice as much as that of France and Italy. To justify this latter type of analysis,
however, we have to assume that the estimated parameters of the model are invariant to
the specification of the policy rule, and we are confronted with the Lucas critique.
Again, one should also note that, for any of these studies, the confidence bands around
these responses are such that the differences across countries are likely to be not
significant. In addition, Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998) show that screening the full space
of observationally equivalent identifications of monetary policy shocks for Germany,
                                                     
21 See also Guiso et al. (2000) for a discussion of this problem.
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France and the United Kingdom, one can build very similar impulse responses of GDP
and prices to monetary policy shocks.
Given these criticisms on the limited power of quantitative comparisons of impulse
responses to monetary policy shocks across countries, one can conclude that the evidence
of cross-country differences in the transmission brought about by any single paper is not
robust across studies. This is partially confirmed by a recent study that has attempted to
test formally the cross-country differences in the transmission mechanism. Ciccarelli and
Rebucci (2001) estimate a dynamic heterogeneous panel on a sample that pools
macroeconomic data for Germany, France, Italy and Spain. They show that the
cumulative impact of monetary policy on economic activity is not significantly different
across countries.
Table 1: Effect of monetary policy on output
DE FR IT ES FI BE NL AT IR PT
Mojon and Peersman -0.20 -0.20 -0.12 -0.14 -0.44 -0.32 -0.45 -0.25 -0.32 -0.08
BIS: National central banksb -0.37 -0.36 -0.44 -0.25 -0.23 -0.18 -0.14
BIS: FRB multi-country b -0.72 -0.70 -0.44
Gerlach and Smets 1 -0.28 -0.19 -0.31
Gerlach and Smets 2b -1.00 -0.50 -0.50
Barran et al. -0.65 -0.46 -0.30 -0.55 -0.36 -0.35 -0.48
Britton and Whitley -0.60 -0.62
Ramaswamy and Sloek -0.75 -0.48 -0.50 -0.28 -0.85 -0.95 -0.60 -0.70
Ehrmann a -0.90 -0.40 -0.42 -0.22 -0.60 -0.36 -0.10 -0.05 -0.30 -0.40
Dedola and Lippi a c -1.61 -0.66 -1.07
Dornbusch et al. -1.40 -1.54 -2.14 -1.54
Mihov b -0.55 -0.35 -0.40 -0.30 -0.35
Peersman and Smets -0.87 -1.15 -1.85 -1.80 -1.00 -0.93
Clements et al. -0.80 -2.20 -1.10 -1.30 -1.70 -1.40 -1.10 -1.00 -1.20 -0.30
Peersman -0.28 -0.19 -0.17 -0.22 -0.18 -0.11 -0.17
Note: maximum impact; data not comparable across studies. DE = Germany, FR = France, IT = Italy, ES =
Spain, FI = Finland, BE = Belgium, NL = the Netherlands, AT = Austria, IR = Ireland, PT = Portugal.
a: effect of monetary policy on industrial production.
b: effect of a 100 basis points, eight quarters sustained increase of the interest rate.
c: effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the short-term rate.
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4.3 Pre-EMU “euro area monetary policy” and national monetary policy histories
One interesting outcome of a monetary policy identification exercise is that it allows a
retrospective view on when the monetary policy shock contributed to the evolution of the
variables of the model. More importantly, we want to be able to relate the evolution of the
monetary policy stance of the euro area in the pre-EMU period of the sample to the
monetary policy histories of the individual countries.
Graph 2 plots the estimated policy shocks and their historical contribution to the domestic
interest rate for each of the countries. In the left panel of each graph, the full line is the
first difference of the interest rate, and the bars are the monetary policy shocks. In the
right panel, the bars are the contribution of the monetary policy shocks to the (domestic)
short term interest rate, whereas the full line is the contribution of the accumulation of all
shocks to the short term interest rate.
The contribution of those shocks to interest rate developments differs across countries.
For the euro area as a whole, it is clear that the years 1982, 1987, 1990 and 1992-93 are
identified as periods of relatively tight monetary policy, whereas in 1984 and 1991 policy
is estimated to be relatively loose. The mixed experience of the individual countries
during the EMS crisis is striking. Monetary policy tightening in France, in Italy, and also
in other countries except in Germany add up into a sharp tightening at the euro area level.
On the contrary, German monetary policy was not too restrictive during the period 1992-
93. This means that the high interest rate in Germany after the re-unification can be
explained by the endogenous response of the Bundesbank to a booming economy.
However, the stance of monetary policy for the other countries, which kept a fixed
exchange rate vis-à-vis Germany, was too restrictive in view of the recession they were in.
Another remarkable feature is that the proportion of the monetary policy shocks to the
accumulated shocks of all the variables is very low in Germany compared to the other
main countries of the Eurosystem. The reaction of monetary policy to price and output
shocks was much more important in Germany. On the other hand, this proportion is also
very low for Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria. For these countries, the reaction to
exchange rate shocks is very important.
The cross-country comparison of the shocks is put into sharper focus in Table 2, which
reports the correlations of the identified monetary policy shocks, and the first difference
of the interest rate, across countries and with the euro area. The monetary policy of Italy,
France and Spain contributes largely to the euro area aggregate. The correlation of the
domestic monetary policy shock with the area-wide shock is respectively 0.51, 0.49, and
0.46. On the contrary, the German monetary policy shock, which is identified on a sample
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period which also includes the 1970s, is much less correlated to the euro area shock. It is
worth noting that looking at the correlation of the first difference of the policy rate shows
that both Italy, France and Spain, but also countries of the core EMS see their interest rate
highly correlated to the euro area one.
Table 2: Correlations of monetary policy shocks and interest rates
across countries
Domestic monetary policy shocks
Ea De It Fr Es Fi Gr Ir
Euro area 1.00 0.08 0.51 0.49 0.46 0.13 -0.11 -0.08
Germany 1.00 0.10 -0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.19 -0.35
Italy 1.00 0.34 0.30 0.08 -0.16 -0.07
France 1.00 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.00
Spain 1.00 0.07 0.02 -0.06
Finland 1.00 -0.05 -0.01
Greece 1.00 -0.04
Ireland 1.00
Policy interest rates
Ea De It Fr Es Fi Nl Be At Gr Ir
Euro area 1.00 0.73 0.71 0.79 0.42 0.37 0.68 0.57 0.65 -0.14 0.36
Germany 1.00 0.29 0.48 0.04 0.22 0.80 0.53 0.70 -0.20 0.09
Italy 1.00 0.35 0.22 0.40 0.25 0.33 0.42 -0.13 0.24
France 1.00 0.23 0.16 0.48 0.61 0.44 -0.07 0.46
Spain 1.00 0.04 0.16 -0.19 -0.05 -0.08 0.08
Finland 1.00 0.26 0.28 0.35 -0.18 0.04
Netherlands 1.00 0.36 0.73 -0.18 0.12
Belgium 1.00 0.52 -0.20 0.30
Austria 1.00 -0.20 0.15
Greece 1.00 -0.37
Ireland 1.00
4.4 Further evidence on the effects of monetary policy shocks
In this section, we discuss the influence of a monetary policy shock on other
macroeconomic variables that are not included in the basic model. We have done this by
estimating the following equations:
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The system of equations [8] is very similar to [1]. tX  is still the block of exogenous
variables and tY  the endogenous block. Let tZ be another macro-economic variable (for
example investment). Again, we suppose that neither contemporaneous nor lagged values
of the endogenous variables have an influence on the exogenous block. This is also the
case for our variable of interest. However, we suppose the same for our macro-economic
variable, tZ , with respect to our endogenous block of variables, tY , i.e. there is no impact
of the variable under investigation on the other variables in the system. This assumption
ensures that the shocks are invariant to the choice of the macroeconomic variable added
to the original model. We show in Graph 3 for a few examples that this modelling
assumption obtains the same impulse response as if the variable was included in the VAR.
4.4.1 The impact on GDP components
Graphs 4a, 4b and 4c present for each individual country the response of investment,
consumption and exports respectively to a monetary policy shock. With the notable
exception of Greece and Ireland, the response of investment is at least twice as large as
the response of consumption. Investment response is, however, insignificant in both
countries, and the response of consumption is insignificant for Greece. These results are
broadly consistent with the ones of Barran et al. (1997) for models estimated on a sample
period spanning from 1975 to 1993. They reflect the fact that consumption is smoother
than investment over the business cycle, but also possibly the income effects of monetary
policy, whereby net-debtor investors revise their expenditure plans more than net-
creditors consumers. These results are also consistent with the area-wide results obtained
in Peersman and Smets (2001).
For most countries, we find a strong impact of a monetary policy shock on exports. For
instance, Austrian, Belgian and Dutch exports are affected by the appreciation of the real
effective German exchange rate, while their nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis Germany
hardly moves (Belgium and the Netherlands) or slightly depreciates (Austria). In these
three countries, as well as in France, the dampening effect of contractionary monetary
policy shocks on exports is larger than the one observed on GDP. In Finland, exports
decrease as well and this fall is slower and smaller than the one observed for GDP.
Finally, for Italy and Spain, we do not find a negative impact of contractionary monetary
policy shocks on exports. The impact is even significantly positive in the latter country.
This finding is not necessarily surprising given the exchange rate puzzle in these
ECB •  Work ing  Pape r  No  92  •  December  2001 23
countries. However, the positive response of exports is not large enough to make the
response of Spanish and Italian GDP deviate from the “typical” responses of GDP
observed in most countries and at the Euro area level.
4.4.2 No liquidity puzzle
We have not considered money in our identification of monetary policy shocks because it
had a much less important role than the exchange rate for all the countries, which were
targeting a fixed exchange rate with the DM within the EMS.  We nevertheless check that
our identification is not characterised by a “liquidity puzzle”. This “puzzle” stresses the
risk of confusing money demand shocks and money supply shocks. A positive shock to
money, which would be accompanied by a rise in the interest rate, is more likely to
correspond to a money demand shock than to a monetary policy shock.
We estimated the response of M1 to the monetary policy shock identified in section 3.
The central bank can better control this narrow aggregate than M3 because the yield on
time deposits and on money mutual funds, which are the main components of “M3-M1” is
correlated to the short-term interest rate. Hence a contractionary monetary policy shock
triggers an increase in the yield of time deposits and money mutual funds so that M3
decreases less than M122. As expected, the monetary policy shock triggers an immediate
fall of M1 in all countries except France, Greece and Ireland (Graph 5). This further
confirms the correctness of our identification scheme.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have used VAR models to analyse the effects of a monetary policy shock
in the individual countries of the euro area in the pre-EMU period. First, we show that
three, relatively simple identification schemes, depending on the monetary policy decision
process in the ERM, obtain well behaved and qualitatively consistent effects of the
monetary policy shocks in all the individual countries of the euro area. We confirm that,
for these countries, the qualitative effects of monetary policy are quite similar to the ones
described in a large literature for the US and by Peersman and Smets (2001) for the euro
area aggregates. A contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a temporary fall in GDP
that peaks typically around four quarters after the shock and a gradual decrease in the
price level. The investment response and the export response are generally larger than the
one of GDP while the response of consumption is smaller. We show also that the shocks
                                                     
22 See the appendix where the response of M3-M1 to monetary policy shocks is reported.
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are initially accompanied by a decline in a narrow monetary aggregate. The effect on the
exchange rate is somewhat more mixed. For some countries, we are confronted with an
exchange rate puzzle. However, the temporary depreciation of the DM exchange rate
observed in some countries does not seem to affect the response of GDP nor the response
of prices. Second, this analysis allows us to compare the “artificial” monetary policy
shocks measured for the euro area with the ones of the individual countries. The euro area
shocks seem to be dominated by the French, the Italian and the Spanish monetary policy
shocks. In particular, the early 1990s appear as a contraction for the euro area and for
most of the individual countries while the Bundesbank was just reacting to the
reunification boom.
Finally, the paper stresses that, given that the confidence bands around the responses are
generally large, one can not use VAR models to conclude that some countries are
characterised by larger effects of monetary policy than others. Another problem with this
approach is that the size of the estimated monetary policy shocks and the reaction
function of the central bank differ across countries. One way to solve this is to standardise
the monetary policy shock across countries and to use the same reaction function for all
countries. However, to justify this type of analysis, we have to assume that the estimated
parameters of the model are invariant to the specification of the policy rule, and we are
confronted with the Lucas critique. Further research that will build formal tests of the
cross-country differences in the transmission mechanism is certainly useful.
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Appendix: The effects of monetary policy on components of M3, bank loans
and bank retail interest rates.
In this appendix we describe the responses of components of M3, bank loans and bank
retail interest rates23 to a monetary policy shock. These responses were computed adding
in turn each variable of interest to the country VAR, as described in section 4.5 of the text
for GDP components.
Components of M3
The two panels of Graph A1 report the responses of various types of deposits and interest
rates to a monetary shock. Three features are worth underlining.
First, as shown in the upper panel, while M1 decreases on impact with the monetary
policy shock, M3-M1 increases for at least a few quarters in most countries. The
movement of the latter aggregate, which is mostly composed of time deposits and money
mutual funds, indicates that in all of the countries except Greece and Italy the banks are
seeking to raise alternative funds to offset the contraction in demand deposits. This
pattern is similar to the result obtained by Peersman and Smets (2001) for the euro area
aggregate of M3-M1.
Second, the lower panel shows the interest rate moves that accompany the quantity
changes. The time deposit rate which is effectively the “own interest yield” of M3-M1
increases at least in the short run in all countries except in Greece (where M3-M1 is
decreasing)24. The similarity of the pattern of responses of the “own yield” and of the M3-
M1 aggregate within the year following the monetary policy shock is striking in several
countries. Third, we observe in a majority of countries (Germany, Belgium, France, the
Netherlands, Greece and Ireland) that the response of M3-M1 reflects the change in the
spread between the interest rate on time deposits and the one of government bond yield.
Moreover, we know that in Italy, most of the short-term securities are treasury bills,
which are not part of M3. This may explain why the increase in the Italian time deposits
interest rate is not accompanied by an increase of M3-M1.
                                                     
23 See appendix 2 of Agresti and Mojon (2001) for a description of the data sources.
24 The interest rate on Austrian time deposits is not available for a long enough sample to measure its
response to a monetary policy shock.
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Bank loans
The responses of different categories of loans and bank loan rates to the monetary policy
shock are shown the various panels of Graph A2. The upper panel shows the responses of
bank loans to the private sector and where available separates the responses into loans to
households and loans to businesses.  Loans to the private sector decrease after a monetary
policy shock in all countries except in Ireland. However, this decrease occurs only after
about four quarters in France and in Spain and after two years in Austria. More
importantly, the decline in loans peaks about a year after the peak decline in GDP (see
Graph 1). We also notice that loans to firms and loans to households have very different
responses to monetary policy in France and in Germany. In France, loans to firms
decrease more markedly than loans to households (which actually increase), while in
Germany, loans to firms decrease less than loans to households.
The remaining two panels report on mortgage rates and short-term loan rates to
businesses.  With a few exceptions (the Belgian and Greek mortgage rates) the retail
banks interest rate on loans, either short-term loans to firms or mortgage loans, increase
following a monetary policy tightening. The response of bank retail rates on short-term
credit to firms is generally smaller than the response of the money market interest rate.
This interest rate smoothing by banks is compatible with either banks restricting loans to
the low credit risk segment of the market or shielding their customers from interest rate
shock. The relative response of mortgage rates and government bond rates is more
diversified across countries. The response of the former is smoother than the one of the
latter only in half of the countries.
Summing up, we find that a contractionary monetary policy shock increases the marginal
cost of raising deposits for banks and the interest rates on bank loans. This is
accompanied by a decline in loans. Unfortunately, our reduced form approach do not
permit to evaluate to what extent this decline is mainly driven by the normal shift of loan
demand to the increase of bank interest rates or if it is amplified by a contraction of the
supply of loans.
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Graph 1a: Identification of Monetary policy shocks
(Dotted lines = 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles; full line = IRF)
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Graph 1b: Identification of Monetary policy shocks
(Dotted lines = 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles; full line = IRF)
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Graph 2: Monetary policy shocks and their contribution to the short-term
interest rate for the euro area, Germany, France, Italy, Spain
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Note: left panel, the full line is the first difference of the interest rate, and the bars are the monetary policy shocks.
Right panel, the bars are the contribution of the monetary policy shocks to the (domestic) short term interest rate,
whereas the full line is the contribution of the accumulation of (all) past shocks to the short term interest rate.
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 Graph 3: Block recursive VAR (full line) and standard VAR (dotted line)
(response to an monetary policy shock and associated confidence bands)
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Graph 4a: Consumption
(Dotted lines = 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles; full line = IRF)
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Graph 4b: Investment
(full lines = 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles; dotted line = IRF)
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Graph 4c: Exports
(Dotted  lines = 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles; full line: IRF)
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Graph 5: Money (M1)
(Dotted lines = 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles; full line = IRF)
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Graph A1a: Responses of M1 (full lines) and M3-M1 (dotted lines) to a
monetary policy shock∗
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Graph A1b: Responses of time deposits rates (full lines) and
government bond rates (dotted lines) to a monetary policy shock
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∗ Graph A1 and A2: See the text for the presentation of the VARs estimated for each country.
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Graph A2a: Responses of bank loans to the private sector (full lines),
loans to households (dotted lines) and loans to firms (broken lines) to a
monetary policy shock
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Graph A2b: Responses of the rates on short-term loans to firms (full
lines) and 3 months money market rates (dotted lines) to a monetary
policy shock
Germany
0 10 20
-0.32
-0.16
0.00
0.16
0.32
0.48
Austria
0 10 20
-0.27
-0.18
-0.09
-0.00
0.09
0.18
0.27
0.36
Belgium
0 10 20
-0.27
-0.18
-0.09
-0.00
0.09
0.18
0.27
Netherlands
0 10 20
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
-0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
France
0 10 20
-0.18
-0.09
0.00
0.09
0.18
0.27
0.36
0.45
0.54
Italy
0 10 20
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Spain
0 10 20
-0.32
-0.16
0.00
0.16
0.32
0.48
0.64
0.80
0.96
Finland
0 10 20
-0.16
0.00
0.16
0.32
0.48
0.64
Greece
0 10 20
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
Ireland
0 10 20
-0.16
0.00
0.16
0.32
0.48
0.64
0.80
0.96
ECB •  Work ing  Pape r  No  92  •  December  2001 41
Graph A2c: Responses of mortgage rates (full lines) and government
bond rates (dotted lines) to a monetary policy shock
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